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Argentine Jurisprudence: Deltec Update
MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON*
In the 1973 case of Compahia Swift de La Plata, S.A. (CiR.
Swift), the Supreme Court of Argentina ruled that the bankruptcy
estate should include not only the assets of Swift, but also the entire
assets of what the Court referred to as the "Deltec Group."1 The
decision established a theory of the economic unit, or unidad
econbrnica.2 The theory justifies the aggregation of a parent corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries based upon a finding of close economic rela-
tions. The theory does not require any proof of fraud or misuse of the
corporate structure. The Supreme Court of Argentina rejected the
more traditional acknowledgement of the separate liability of a parent
and its subsidiaries as an overly "formalistic use of the legal structures
constituting business associations," suggesting that such legal for-
malism was "foreign to the objectives sought or to the social realities
which would legitimize such objectives." 3  The Court further indi-
cated that "the legal structures which the laws of Argentina provide
for lawful activities cannot legalize economic and financial policies
contrary to the needs of our society, effectively recognized by the
* Professor of Law and Latin American Studies, University of Florida. B.S.,
L.L.B., University of Connecticut; M.A., Trinity College; Dipl. de Droit, Stras-
bourg. Of Counsel, Ogarrio y Gaxiola, Mexico City. The author is most indebted for
discussions and correspondence with Max A. Stolper, Esq., who served as chief legal
officer for Deltec until 1974, and who has continued, since then, to represent Deltec
as a practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. Attorney Stolper kindly provided the
author with various documents relating to the controversy, including translations of
the 1976 and 1977 decisions, and has taken substantial time to comment on the cases.
1. Compaiiia Swift de La Plata, S.A. Frigorifica si convocatoria de acreedores
[1973-191 JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 579, 151 REVISTA JURIDICA ARGENTI,\A-LA
LEY 516 (1973) [hereinafter Cia. Swift]. The decision is translated in Gordon, Argen-
tine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. AM. 320, 330 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Parke Davis and Deltec Cases]. Citations to the Cia. Swift deci-
sion refer to this translation. The Court defined the "Deltec Group" only as "the
companies comprising the 'Deltec Group,' especially ... Deltee International Li-
mited and Deltec Argentina S.A.F. and M.'" 6 LAW. Am. 320, 339 (1974). This
specific identification of only two members of the group was very important to the
1976 and 1977 decisions.
2. In this writer's review of the 1973 Cia. Swift decision, the economic unit was
referred to as the conjunto econ6mico. The Argentine courts use the term unidad
econ6mica rather than conjunto econ6mico, the latter tending to refer to the neces-
sary degree of affiliation between enterprises which would allow the filing of a con-
solidated tax return. This writer thanks Attorney Max A. Stolper for his comment on
this terminology distinction.
3. Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1, at 338.
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judiciary of the country." 4  This decision of the Court has been criti-
cally analyzed, 5 and however one views the economic unit theory, the
Cia. Swift decision was an extremely important pronouncement,
stressing that economic expansion and social justice palliated a judicial
rejection of previously accepted forms of economic association.
Two subsequent decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court in-
volving units of the Deltec Group illustrate the development and at
least partial demise of the economic unit theory. These decisions
were handed down in September 1976 and December 1977. When
these decisions are considered in the context of the 1976 military
takeover in Argentina and the Foreign Investment Acts of 1974 and
1976, they illustrate the evolution of the executive, legislative, and
judicial attitude toward foreign investment. More importantly, they
offer a perceptive insight as to the parallel development of policy fluc-
tuations toward foreign investment by the three constitutionally sepa-
rate branches of Argentine government. This brief article will con-
sider the 1976 and 1977 decisions in the context of political and
economic developments in Argentina during this decade.
I. BACKGROUND FOR CHANGE
At the time of the 1973 Cia. Swift decision, foreign investments
were governed principally by the Foreign Investment Act of August
5, 1971.6 The 1971 Act did not contain any provision suggesting the
liability of a parent for the commercial acts of its subsidiary. The law
4. Id
5. See Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1. The frustration of
the Court in particular, and Third World nations in general, as to the elusive nature
of the multinational, is illustrated by the Court's comments that:
[T]he key factor to consider in deciding the issue presented is that the
legal regime of the juridical personality cannot be used to prejudice the
paramount interests of society, nor the rights of third parties. The means
used by the State to prevent business associations from existing as mere
corporate shells vary and have different names, but they all conform to
economic and social realities and proclaim the supremacy of the law. It is
obvious that the above acquires special relevance when the judges have to
face the complex legal problems created by business associations in the
modern world. Today these associations are characterized by their inter-
dependence, linkages, and their multinational nature. These factors, to-
gether with the difficulties attendant upon their control, the increase in
their influence and the interrelationships of their administrative organiza-
tions-through real or apparent affiliates-strengthens their power of con-
centration. Id. at 337-38.
6. Ley No. 19.551 of Ago. 5, 1971. [1972] ANALES DE LEGISLACi6N ARGENTINA
1847. Translated in 10 I.L.M. 1194 (1971). Citations to the law refer to this transla-
tion.
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was comparatively brief and was not severely restrictive as to foreign
investments. It provided for registration of new foreign investments
and approval by the executive upon consideration of some fifteen
criteria. 7 There were no provisions requiring joint ventures, nor was
the law retroactive, with the exception that current investments had
to be registered and had limited use of local credit in the future. 8
The basis of the 1973 Supreme Court decision, however, was not the
1971 Foreign Investment Act, nor had any other subsequent legisla-
tive decrees governing foreign investments created the economic unit
theory.
The 1973 Cia. Swift decision illustrates the sense of frustration of
Third World governments in understanding and regulating the multi-
national corporation. Lacking legislative support, or what might be
accepted as customary law, the ruling of the Supreme Court created
the concept of the economic unit in a decision which must be consid-
ered judge-made law. One might, perhaps, more accurately label the
decision as "judge decreed executive policy." There was no doubt, at
the time, that executive policy under the then recently reestablished
Peronist administration was more restrictive toward foreign invest-
ment than the executive policy of the previous administration or the
1971 Foreign Investment Act. The March 1973 election of Hector
Ciimpora as President (personally chosen by former President Juan
Peron to establish conditions for Pcr6n's return to power), first
suggested that there would be a new attitude toward foreign invest-
ment. Campora's party, Frente Justicialista de Liberaci6n, announced
that new foreign investment rules would be established. The prom-
ised legislative reforms included more extensive government control
of meat exports and the adoption of restrictions on acquisitions of
local firms by foreign enterprises. Although these reform issues were
related to Swift's business, they did not directly affect Swift since its
dispute was already before the Argentine courts, and, at the time,
none of the companies owned by Deltec in Argentina had been ac-
quired from Argentine investors.
As expected, the foreign investment draft law proposed in June
1973, resembled Decision 24 of the Andean Common Market, 9 and
included parallel definitions of foreign, mixed, and local investors;
fade-out provisions; a profit remittance limitation; and regulations on
7. Id. at art. 4.
8. Id. at art. 15.
9. Standard Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capital and for Treatment of
Marks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, Andean Commission, Decision No. 24 of
Dec. 31, 1970. See Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code. A New Phase in
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reinvestment and local borrowing. The draft law contained no refer-
ence to the economic unit theory, however, including only limitations
on parent company loans to subsidiaries, which restricted the interest
rates to two points over current bank rates in the country of ori-
gin. 10 This draft provision affirmed a continued acceptance of the
separate parent-subsidiary status, as well as the right of the parent to
be a creditor of its subsidiary, a position criticized by the lower court
in Cia. Swift, and identified by the Supreme Court as evidence of the
close economic relationship between the parent and subsidiary.1 1
Two months after the 1973 Supreme Court ruling, the new
Foreign Investment Law was enacted; it included the above noted
provisions similar to those of Decision 24. The most significant addi-
tion, however, was Article 31, apparently placed as an afterthought in
a section entitled "Final Provisions." Article 31 stated that "Liability
resulting from obligations undertaken by a local company receiving
the foreign investment shall be jointly and severally assumed by the
foreign investor." 12 Legislative sanction of the 1973 Cia. Swift deci-
sion's reliance on the economic unit theory was thus accomplished.
The new Foreign Investment Law additionally affirmed the draft law's
limitation on interest for foreign source loans to two percent above
the current rate for first class securities in the country of origin. The
provision, however, did not refer to parents and subsidiaries, but to
"juridical persons domiciled in the country, and creditors domiciled
abroad."13 These provisions expressed executive concern regarding
borrowing relationships between parents and subsidiaries, a concern
which was also illustrated by Judge Lozada's lower court decision in
Cia. Swift. Lozada thought it inappropriate for Deltec International
Limited, as a principal creditor of the subsidiary in the bankruptcy
proceedings, to claim "against a debtor that is also Deltec." 14
the Quest Jr Nonnative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
763 (1972). Decision No. 24 has since been amended and is translated in 16 I.L.M.
138 (1977).
10. See Bus. LATIN Am., June 28, 1973, at 201.
11. Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1, at 335-36. The Su-
preme Court has stated that, "These statements [that Deltec Group entity claims
against Cia. Swift amounted to 37.66% of the total claims of creditors] by the Com-
mercial Court of Appeals totally omit consideration by that Court of the true nature
of the juridical personality . .. [i-e , the economic unit]."
12. Lev No. 20.557 of Nov. 7, 1973, [1973] ANALES DE LEGISIAcION ARGEN-
TINA [hereinafter cited as 1973 Foreign Investment Law]. Translated in 12 I.L.M.
1489 (1973). Citations to the law refer to this translation.
13. Id. at art. 26.
14. [1973-75] JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 350, 351; 146 REVISTA JURIDICA
ARGENTINA-LA LEY 601, 602 (1973).
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The 1973 Foreign Investment Law was certainly not welcomed
by the foreign investment community. Many of its provisions were
nevertheless similar to restrictions in foreign investment laws of other
Latin American nations, where the same multinationals were conduct-
ing business. Such laws included the Mexican Investment Law of
1973,15 the Mexican Transfer of Technology Law of 1972,16 and Deci-
sion 24 of the Andean Common Market of 1970.17 None of those
laws, however, nor any other investment legislation in the hemis-
phere, included any provision stipulating that a parent and a sub-
sidiary consist of a single economic unit. The Argentine legislation
embodying the economic unit theory reinforced its judicial adoption,
and gave some post-mortem support to the Cia Swift ruling. There
appears, however, to have been no application of the economic unit
theory other than to the Deltec group, unless one includes the 1973
Parke Davis case, where there was a questionable need for using the
economic unit theory. 18 Not all foreign investors will view the
economic unit provisions with the same concern. A foreign parent
with only one subsidiary in Argentina may have some assurance that
the economic unit theory, as announced by the Argentine Supreme
Court, will not be accepted by foreign courts.
Although the 1973 Foreign Investment Law of Argentina was
generally no more restrictive than the laws of the Andean Common
Market and of Mexico, foreign investors are usually sensitive to the
degree of restrictiveness in current and proposed legislation, and how
that legislation relates to executive and judicial attitudes toward
foreign investment. One might well try to quantify the degree of re-
strictiveness of various provisions that regulate foreign investment.
Such provisions include mandatory joint venture requirements,
foreign technology registration, retroactive applications, short-term
credit limitations, repatriation of profit restrictions, economic unit
theories, and fade-out provisions. The degree of flexibility permitted
the government by foreign investment legislation is critically impor-
tant, though difficult to measure. Was the executive permitted to
15. Ley Para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera
Feb. 7, 1973, D.O., Mar. 9, 1973. See generally Gordon, The Contemporary Mexi-
can Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled But Participatory In-
dependence, 10 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 1 (1973).
16. Ley Sobre el Registro de la Transferencia de Technologia y el Uso y Explota-
ci6n de Patentes y Marcas, Dec. 28, 1972, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972.
17. See Decision No. 24, supra note 9.
18. Parke Davis v. Cia de Argentina S.A.I.C. s/ recurso de apelaci6n. Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Buenas Aires, 31 Julio 1973, C-705-XVI. Discussed
at Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1.
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moderate the restrictions when economic needs so dictated? The
Argentine law appeared no less capable of executive interpretation
than the laws of Mexico or the Andean Common Market. Certain
provisions specifically allowed the executive to proceed at its own
pace, and granted the executive the power to take necessary mea-
sures to reconvert to Argentine ownership any company which had
been transferred to foreign investors through a previous denationali-
zation process. 19
The experience of foreign investors in Argentina with regard to
parallel executive and legislative policy is not atypical. Even a cursory
study of the changing governments in Latin American nations will
illustrate either the adoption of new foreign investment laws, or the
alteration of the manner of interpreting existing laws to meet new
executive policies which are more or less restrictive toward foreign
investment. What is suggested from the Deltec experience in Argen-
tina, although not proven solely by this enterprise's history, is the
association of the judicial branch with the executive and legislative
branches, forming a three-tiered parallel structure with a common
approach toward foreign investment, but without the benefit of any
check and balance on the abuse of executive power. Even without the
merging of the judiciary, there is sound reason to believe in the exis-
tence of a common executive-legislative policy toward foreign invest-
ment; this does not mean, however, that the executive-legislative as-
sociation itself is easily identifiable as either coherent or other than
transitory. Foreign investors' perception of such policy may also be at
variance. What appears to be a formulated policy may actually be
indecision and a tendency to "live and let live" rather than to make
the hard decisions which constitute policy.
The 1973 law remained in effect until 1976, during the period of
power of Per6n and, subsequently, his widow. The military leader-
ship which assumed power through a coup in 1976 soon presented a
new investment law which, as expected, was less restrictive than the
1973 law. It was particularly designed to renew foreign interest in
investing in Argentina which had diminished markedly during the
Per6n administration.
The Foreign Investment Law enacted in August 1976, did not
eliminate the economic unit theory. 20 It did, however, significantly
19. 1973 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 12, at art. 33.
20. Ley No. 21.382 of Ago. 13, 1976. [1976] ANALES DE LEGISLACION ARGEN-
TINA [hereinafter cited as 1976 Foreign Investment Law]. Translated in 15 I.L.M.
1364 (1976). Citations to the law refer to this translation.
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modify the theory, presumably as a result of very negative reaction
by multinational corporations to the 1973 Cia. Swift decision. The
principal provision of the 1976 investment law directed to the
economic unit theory stipulates that:
[TIransactions carried out between a domestic enterprise of foreign
capital and the enterprise by which it is directly and nationally
controlled and any subsidiary thereof, shall be considered for all
purposes, as transactions between independent parties, when the
performances rendered and the conditions of such transaction are
in accordance with normal business practices between independent
entities .... 21
There are two exceptions. The first applies to loans, and allows the
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic to review all proposed loans
to determine whether parent-subsidiary loans shall be treated as loans
between separate entities. 2 2 The second exception is for contracts
which are governed by the law of transfers of technology. 23 That law
governs the contractual technology relationship of the parent and sub-
sidiary and is principally concerned with the way in which technology
is compensated. Argentina treats royalty payments as dividends; they
are not deductible prior to taxation.
Because of these exceptions dealing with technology and credit,
the 1976 Foreign Investment Law did not fully reverse the economic
unit theory of the Parke Davis and Cia. Swift cases. The manner of
payment for technology was the crucial issue in the Parke Davis case.
In the Cia. Swift litigation, the status of Deltec International Li-
mited, although an ancillary question, was nonetheless of signal im-
portance. The transfer of technology law, in existence at the time of
the enactment of the 1976 Foreign Investment Law, treated technol-
ogy payments between a subsidiary and parent as profit remittance,
although there was some thought that a proposed new technology law
might change this attitude.
Nevertheless, the restrictive approach toward foreign investment
was substantially lessened by the 1976 Foreign Investment Law.
Principal criticisms of the new law focused on the approval require-
ments for new foreign investments and on the excess profit taxes.
Also of significance was the elimination of the mixed enterprise clas-
sification, which had paralleled the form utilized in Decision 24 of the
21. Id. at art. 20.
22. Id. at art. 20(1).
23. Id. at art. 20(2).
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Andean Common Market, designating as mixed companies those in
which foreign capital varied between twenty percent and forty-nine
percent.
II. A STEP FOWVARD: THE 1976 La Esperanza DECISION
The first of the two more recent decisions involving the Deltee
group was decided by the Argentine Supreme Court five weeks after
the enactment of the 1976 Foreign Investment Law. 24 The Court's
treatment of the economic unit theory was consistent with the 1976
law, 25 although the 1977 decision appears to have revived the 1973
Cia. Swift decision.
In the 1976 decision, the Supreme Court first outlined prior pro-
ceedings which had instigated the appeal of La Esperanza, one of the
Deltec Group members. 26 The Court cited in its entirety the four
paragraphs of the Cia. Swift decision which (1) extended the Court's
decree to the assets of the companies "comprising the Deltec Group,"
especially to assets of Deltec International Limited and Deltec Argen-
tina; (2) mandated a proceeding to define the composition of the Del-
tec Group and thus the economic unit; (3) required that the execution
be conducted with respect to all of the identified assets of Cia. Swift;
and (4) allowed the Deltec Group to exercise any rights to which they
were entitled in the proceedings in exclusion or restitution.2 7
The Court noted that two days after the 1973 Cia. Swift deci-
sion, the lower court judge declared the bankruptcy of various enter-
prises and corporations in the Deltec Group including La Esperanza.
The Court additionally noted that La Esperanza, having been in-
cluded as one of the Deltec Group, had appealed, alleging that it had
not been notified of the process leading to the Cia. Swift ruling, and
24. Compafiia Swift de La Plata si quiebra-incidente art. 250 C. Proc [1976]
[hereinafter cited as La Esperanza]. The decision is translated infra at Appendix I.
Citations to the decision refer to this translation.
25. La Esperanza properlv does not cite the 1976 Foreign Investment Law as a
source of its ruling. The law was not applicable to the Swift litigation, the facts of
which had occurred prior even to the 1973 Foreign Investment Law, with which Cia.
Swift was in accord. The 1976 Foreign Investment Law was an important policy
expression, however, and illustrates the parallelism of legislative, judicial, and politi-
cal thought, without regard to what are believed at a given date to be the correct
sources of law.
26. Ingenio La Esperanza was indirectly owned by Deltec International Limited,
and directly owned by Deltec Argentina, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Bahama-based Deltec International Limited.
27. Cia. Swift, Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1, at 339.
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thus had not been able to respond to charges in that decision. This
theory of appeal might in itself be a challenge to the economic unit
theory. The recognition of standing to appeal by any unit of the Del-
tec Group would constitute recognition of separate legal status, a posi-
tion contrary to the view that the entire Deltec Group was an
economic unit and effective jurisdiction over one unit constituted
jurisdiction over the whole group. 28
The National Commercial Court of Appeals, to which La Es-
peranza had then brought its appeal, confirmed the 1973 Supreme
Court Cia. Swift decision, interpreting the proper procedure as con-
sisting only of the "simple verification of the Judge of the bankruptcy
of their condition as such . . . to pretend that in said procedure that
the subject entities be allowed to participate as parties, would be
equivalent to recognition of their character as separate third par-
ties." 29  Thus the Appellate Court did not challenge the economic
unit theory, but accepted that theory as announced in Cia. Swift,
further indicating that no individual units of the Deltec Group could
have separate standing to participate as parties, and that any recogni-
tion of separate standing would be equivalent to admission of their
character as separate third parties and thus contravene the economic
unit theory.
Following the rejection by the National Commercial Court of
Appeals, an extraordinary appeal was presented by La Esperanza to
the Argentine Supreme Court. The appeal attacked the lack of any
proceeding intended to verify any fraud which, La Esperanza
claimed, "must necessarily exist to make possible the extension of the
bankruptcy to all the related corporations." This was in itself a rejec-
tion of the economic unit theory, suggesting that any aggregation of
Deltec Group members could only result from fraudulent conduct. It
is a view even stricter than the piercing of the corporate veil ap-
proach generally accepted in the United States, where something less
than fraud, often termed misuse, may be satisfactory for piercing the
corporate veil.
La Esperanza also argued that there had to be a showing that La
Esperanza was part of an economic unit with Cia. Swift, and that in
the absence of such a showing, the"'autonomous juridical personality
28. One would expect that La Esperanza, or any other alleged member of the
Deltec Group, should be able to challenge its status as a member of the economic
unit, separate trom a challenge to the theory of the economic unit itself. Jurisdiction
might have been challenged, nevertheless, had the original service on Swift been
ineffective as service on an economic unit.
29. See Appendix I, section 1, para. g.
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of the corporation cannot be altered." 3 0 La Esperanza argued that,
without such a showing, they must be considered as separate third
parties vis-a-vis the bankrupt entity, Cia. Swift. The appellant also
suggested that the 1973 Cia. Swift Supreme Court decision should be
held invalid because the scope of its ruling violated the limits of the
original appeal. It had been the Supreme Court which had raised, or
"created," the economic unit theory; there had been no ruling in the
lower court on the issue of an economic unit.
The Supreme Court first ruled that the extraordinary appeal was
in order, indicating that interpretations of the earlier decision of the
Court and the mandatory nature of the decision were at issue, thus
involving a federal question. The Court stated that the Cia. Swift
decision mandated that a proper procedure be followed in determin-
ing which enterprises or corporations comprised the Deltec Group as
identified broadly by paragraph II of the 1973 Cla. Swift ruling of the
Court. The Court indicated that "'[such a procedure evidently in-
volved the adoption of various measures tending to give credit to the
'economic unit' of the enterprises referred to, with a proper hearing
for them because as the [record] demonstrates, not all cases are
exactly alike .... ."31 The Court further stated that the composition
of the economic unit involved questions of fact which had to be
proven in proceedings which allowed alleged members of the
economic unit to present their defenses. The Court thus recognized
the distinction of an appeal on the grounds that one was not a
member of the economic unit from an appeal challenging the
economic unit.
The Court next rejected the decision of the judge of the lower
court. That decision followed the 1973 Cia. Swift ruling by two days,
and declared the bankruptcy of several enterprises presumably form-
ing the Deltec Group. The Court held the latter decision had not
constituted a valid procedure with respect to the appellant, La Es-
peranza. The Court stated that the economic unity of Deltec Interna-
tional and Swift might emerge from those proceedings, but not that of
La Esperanza with Swift. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the
proceeding had involved a unilateral administrative act without record
of any participation or possibility of defense by La Esperanza. The
Court rejected the decision of the lower court on appeal, and ruled
that the bankruptcy procedure did not correctly interpret the decision
of the Supreme Court in 1973, which required a determination of the
30. Id. at section 2.
31. Id. at section 4.
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"other persons or companies making up the group previously men-
tioned insofar as the economic unit exists with the corporation de-
clared bankrupt." 32 The Court noted that the latter statement would
be contradicted by first declaring the bankruptcy of various corpora-
tions and then "implicitly extending it to an imprecise group of en-
terprises." 33 To avoid such a contradiction, a determinative proceed-
ing had to be conducted to identify the composition of the group.
This was a fundamental proceeding, apart from any procedural due
process required at that subsequent proceeding.
The Supreme Court next stated that there should have been a
proper proceeding, accompanied by a record, and conducted in a
"precise and concrete manner," to determine whether La Esperanza
"acted in the interests of and as a representative of 'Swift' or 'Del-
tec."' The Court also stated that it must be determined whether "the
property was disposed of in fraud of the creditors, since by the mere
fact of being linked to the group one cannot presume the perfor-
mance of fraudulent maneuvers tending to prejudice its proprietary
equity situation." 34 Finally, the Court ruled that, in the alternative,
it must be determined whether La Esperanza had engaged in com-
mercial conduct directly or indirectly affecting the state of bankruptcy
of Swift.
The Court thus ruled that piercing the corporate veil in Argen-
tina must depend on a finding of one of the above three situations.
The situation which is clearly recognized in most nations is the exis-
tence of fraud. Fraud would quite obviously require a specific desig-
nation of the fraudulent party and an opportunity to defend the
charge.
The Court suggested a second situation. If a party acts "in the
interest of and as a representative of" the parent, there may be jus-
tification for piercing the veil. 3 5 Unfortunately, the Court failed to
clarify what actions might qualify. A parent undoubtedly is capable of
and, indeed, responsible for determining the corporate policies of its
subsidiary through its selection of the board of directors, in much the
same manner as individual shareholders have the right and the re-
sponsibility to elect directors who will act in their best interests. The
choice of terminology of the Court is indicative of the instrumentality,
alter-ego, and agency concepts of corporate veil theory in the United
32. id. at section 6.
33. Id.
34. Id. at section 7.
35. Id.
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States, terminology which has been used, at best, with confusing con-
sistencv. While one may challenge per se applications of the concepts
of instrumentality, alter-ego, and agency, the Supreme Court of
Argentina at least suggested that they may constitute alternative pre-
requisites to liability, and therefore presumably demand greater at-
tention to proof of conduct than was evidenced by the 1973 Cia.
Swift decision.
The third noted ground postulates that the entity is engaging in
conduct directly or indirectly affecting the state of bankruptcy, pre-
sumably acts which in some way are unlawful and have a damaging
effect on the enterprise in the state of bankruptcy. One might nar-
rowly equate this concept with the "misuse" alternative found in
United States decisions, where courts suggest that piercing the corpo-
rate veil must be grounded on fraud "or other misuse" of the corpo-
rate entity. This listing, by the Court, of alternatives for piercing the
corporate veil was an essential part of the decision for the later appeal
of Deltec Argentina and Deltec International Limited.
The favorable ruling for La Esperanza resolved one of two mat-
ters pending before the Argentine Supreme Court involving the Del-
tec Group. The second matter was a petition by Deltec International
Limited and Deltec Argentina, the latter being the immediate parent
of La Esperanza and itself a direct subsidiary of Deltec International
Limited. The petition requested that the Court annul its 1973 deci-
sion on jurisdictional grounds. The resolution of La Esperanza's ap-
peal, as discussed above, resulted in the Court deeming it unneces-
sary to deal with this second issue.
The La Esperanza decision, however, did not fully resolve the
complex Deltec Group issues. The decision had no effect on the re-
tention by the government of the assets of Deltec International Lim-
ited and Deltec Argentina. The principal holding in the 1976 decision
was that La Esperanza was not specifically named in paragraph I of
the 1973 ruling. The 1973 ruling had stated that the "inclusion of the
assets of Swift de ]a Plata S.A.F. in the bankruptcy estate should also
include the assets of the companies comprising the 'Deltec Group,'
especially those of Deltec International Limited and Deltec Argentina
S.A.F. and M." 3 The 1976 ruling thus involved an enterprise not
specifically identified in paragraph I, although it was unquestionably
one of the Deltec Group.
For various reasons, other enterprises within the Deltec Group
were no longer involved in the proceedings; the principal interests
36. Gordon, Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, supra note 1, at 339.
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remaining to be resolved were those of La Esperanza, adjudicated in
the 1976 decision, and, quite importantly, the remaining interests in
Argentina of Deltec Argentina, as well as the liability of the foreign,
Bahama-based, Deltec International Limited. The question of the lia-
bility of Deltec International Limited was important because of a pos-
sible attempt to enforce the judgment outside of Argentina. 37 If the
Argentine government were to commence a suit on a foreign judg-
ment in the Bahamas, where Deltec International Limited was based,
or in other nations where the company had additional assets, the
question of enforcement of the Argentine judgment in a foreign juris-
diction would have been raised. The issues in such a case would in-
clude both the acceptability of the economic unit theory, and the
question of procedural due process in the Argentine Cia Swift deci-
sion.
III. REGRESSION: THE 1977 DECISION
In early 1977, as part of an Argentine executive interest in de-
creasing state participation in the traditionally private sector, the
bankruptcy court offered to sell the Swift assets, including the two
meat packing plants which it had intervened more than six years ear-
lier. 38 The offer to sell the Swift assets was part of a general plan to
encourage foreign investment, and included the settlement of com-
pensation issues for other nationalized foreign properties, including
those of ITT, Siemens, and several international banks.
39
The bankruptcy court accepted bids for the Swift plant, setting a
minimum price of the Argentine equivalent of $39.6 million, and ul-
timately sold the plant in August 1977 to an Argentine-owned meat
packing company for approximately $42 million. 40  As a result of
further exchange depreciation, by the time of the January 1, 1978
closing, the $42 million was reduced to approximately $36,782,000.41
37. Although Deltec obviously had to be concerned with the possibility of ex-
traterritorial enforcement of the Argentine decree, there is a sparsity of such en-
forcement experience on which to base a serious concern. A reading of the Argentine
decisions does not leave one with the impression that the courts were attempting to
establish the form of record which would stand up to foreign scrutiny in an enforce-
ment proceeding. This may be attributable both because of the absence of a very
careful fact-finding process, and because of the general tone of the opinions.
38. The company first had been taken over by the government in 1971, under a
company plan for financial reorganization.
39. See Bus. LATIN AM., April 20, 1977, at 122.
40. Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
41. Undated memorandum on the position of the companies of Deltee Interna-
tional, courtesy of Max A. Stolper, copy in author's files.
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On November 8, 1971, the date on which Swift was adjudicated
bankrupt, the admitted claims of creditors totalled slightly over $18
million. This figure did not include non-admitted claims, a major por-
tion of which were held by Deltee International Limited. It might
thus have been expected that the sale would have resulted in a satis-
faction of creditors and a distribution of the remaining proceeds to
Deltec International Limited, thereby terminating the lengthy Deltec
controversy. Such was not to be the case; the Argentine government
proved to be as adept at expanding claims against the assets as had
the governments of Peru and Chile regarding claims against the in-
terests of the International Petroleum Company and the various
United States copper companies, respectively. 42
The prospect of receiving a substantial sum after the payment of
creditors was diminished by an indexing statute enacted by Argentina
in December 1976. 43 The law requires the indexing of a bankrupt
company's debts from the date of bankruptcy to the date of payment,
in accordance with the wholesale price index, and additionally adds
interest at the rate of six percent per year. The indexing process, plus
interest, and a further estimated administration cost, increased the
Swift debt obligation as of January 1, 1978, to $49,771,000. Since the
sale of assets was expected to bring $36,782,000, the proceeds were
deficient by some thirteen million dollars. Although the contempla-
tion of a 257% increase in the value of filed claims, amounting to
approximately seventeen percent compounded interest, must have
appeared prospectively encouraging to the Argentine creditors, the
Argentine government pre-empted the fund by filing in court a prior-
ity claim for an additional $23 million, for advances made by the
Argentine government to Swift during its period of intervention. Al-
lowance of the government's claim would diminish the claims of the
admitted creditors by approximately two-thirds. The lower court has
rejected the government's claim of priority and the matter is now
pending on appeal.
Aware that the indexing and interest calculations would eliminate
any possible receipt of a balance, Deltec International Limited pur-
sued its previously filed appeal with the Argentine Supreme Court,
requesting that it overrule the 1973 decision as it applied to Deltee
International Limited and Deltec Argentina. The most recent of the
42. See generally, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (3 vols., R. Lillich ed. & contrib. 1975).
43. Ley No. 21.488 of Nov. 1976. [19761 ANALES DE LEGISLACI6N ARGENTINA.
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Supreme Court decisions involving the Deltec Group was announced
in December 1977, when the Argentine Supreme Court denied the
appeal, essentially on the ground that Deltec International Limited
and Deltec Argentina had been given their days in court.
The composition of the Argentine Supreme Court which decided
the La Esperanza case was entirely altered from that of the 1973
Court. There were four new judges of the chamber for the 1976 deci-
sion. Two of those judges subsequently participated in Deltec's 1977
appeal . 4 4
In deciding the final appeal of Deltec, the Supreme Court first
reviewed the earlier proceedings and then indicated its intention to
strictly interpret the La Esperanza decision of the prior year. Sub-
sequent to the 1973 Cia. Swift decision and the lower court judge's
decree placing in bankruptcy companies believed to be in the Deltec
Group, the companies concerned appealed that decision. The four en-
terprises which appealed, Deltec International Limited, Deltec
Argentina, Swift, and the Deltec Banking Corporation Limited, all
objected to the manner in which the lower court carried out the rul-
ing of the Supreme Court. Those four appellants interpreted the Su-
preme Court's 1973 ruling as requiring the assets of three of the
companies (not including the principal enterprise, Swift) to serve only
as collateral security for the bankruptcy of Swift, but that these com-
panies were not to be placed in actual bankruptcy. Such an interpre-
tation would allow access to the assets of the Deltec Group for the
payment of claims of creditors of Swift, if necessary, but would not
result in complete bankruptcy proceedings against each member of
the group. Once the creditors of Swift had been paid, using assets of
other members of the group if necessary, those enterprises would be
restored to full operating status. This interpretation of the 1973 deci-
sion appeared reasonable if the intent of the ruling was not to cause a
total liquidation of what the court considered to be the economic
unit. The Court did state, nevertheless, in paragraph III of its 1973
decision, that the collective execution should be levied against all of
the assets of the group without first exhausting those of Swift, a pro-
vision in conflict with the position of the appellants. If the economic
unit theory is to be interpreted literally, it necessarily results in the
bankruptcy of the entire economic unit, since bankruptcy could not
apply only to a separate portion or division of the unit. The appellants
argued as though the economic unit theory were inapplicable.
44. These changes were to prove important to the decision, illustrated by the
final comments in the 1977 decision. The alterations in the judiciary suggest that the
Court may be as transitory as the executive.
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The lower court judge had denied a rehearing of the issue and
the National Commercial Court of Appeals next considered the ap-
peal. After the law officer of the appellate court had submitted his
opinion, but while the opinion was pending final decision, Deltec In-
ternational Limited and Deltec Argentina added new arguments to
their appeal: the 1973 decision was not effective because of an unlaw-
ful exercise of jurisdictional power and a violation of the right of de-
fense in the judicial proceeding. These arguments were designed to
take advantage of the La Esperanza decision. Appellants argued that
the Supreme Court, in the 1973 decision, had judicially increased the
severity of the lower court's decision by eliminating the requirement
of the prior exhaustion of Swift's assets before reaching the assets of
the members of the Deltec Group. Deltec International Limited and
Deltec Argentina argued that the court erred in extending the dispo-
sition to those enterprises, both specifically named in the Supreme
Court's 1973 opinion. The latter two appellants had also argued in
their initial appeal that the Court's ruling should not be effective be-
cause they were foreign enterprises. The appellants further suggested
that the 1973 decision should be considered a nullity because it was
necessary to wait to appeal that decision until the members of that
Supreme Court had been replaced. This final argument curiously
suggested that decisions of the judiciary serving under Per6n should
not be valid, an argument which, as expected, was strongly objected
to by the subsequent Supreme Court. This rejection indicated that
the Supreme Court would not corroborate the nonexistence of the
judicial branch of government during the Per6n era.
The National Commercial Court of Appeals concluded that in the
1976 La Esperanza decision, the Supreme Court had recognized the
existence of the 1973 decision and had analyzed and applied that de-
cision to the issues in the La Esperanza appeal. The appellate court
stated that the Supreme Court obviously could not have done so if it
had considered the decision nonexistent. The concession of the Su-
preme Court in the La Esperanza decision was the reason the Na-
tional Commercial Court of Appeals denied this argument of Deltec
International Limited and Deltec Argentina.
Deltec International Limited and Deltec Argentina, thus, finally
reached the Supreme Court with their appeal and requested rejection
of the appellate court holding concerning the validity of the 1973 de-
cision. The appeal was based on an interpretation of the La Es-
peranza case, on the question of the existence of the 1973 decision,
and on the constitutional protection discussed in La Esperanza. Ap-
pellants argued that the appellate court had not considered funda-
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mental questions such as lack of jurisdiction and denial of due pro-
cess.
The Supreme Court stated that Deltec had acquiesced in the
1973 decision by challenging the lower court's action in carrying out
that decision by a declaration of bankruptcy as to the companies com-
prising the Deltec Group. 45 Deltec had alleged that the lower court
unconstitutionally exceeded the decree of the Supreme Court declar-
ing the bankruptcy of the companies constituting the Deltec Group.
Deltec had further argued that a judge cannot ignore the bounds of a
Supreme Court decision; rather it "must be faithfully followed both
by the parties and by judicial organs that participate in controver-
sies." 4 6  The Supreme Court considered this challenge to have im-
plicitly recognized the existence of the 1973 decision.
The Supreme Court also effectively prevented Deltec from rais-
ing an alternative argument: even if the 1973 Supreme Court decision
was not a nullity, its requirements were nonetheless incorrectly fol-
lowed by the lower court in decreeing the bankruptcy of the Deltec
Group. One might well view this argument as not being alternative in
nature. Instead, it could be argued that there was: (1) a challenge to
the 1973 Supreme Court decision, claiming the decision was a nullity;
and (2) a challenge to the lower court's bankruptcy decision arguing
that the lower court's decision must follow any decision of the Sup-
reme Court which it is executing. The second challenge does not
necessarily admit that the particular decision of the Supreme Court
was correct; it is essentially against the lower court procedure and not
against the Supreme Court decision. The Argentine Supreme Court
nevertheless stated that it was a settled judicial principle that without
an express reservation, a voluntary submission to a judicial decision,
or to the jurisdiction of the Court or a particular legal regime, consti-
tutes "'an unequivocal adherence thereto which rules out a sub-
sequent constitutional challenge thereof by way of extraordinary ap-
peal." 4 7 One must thus inquire into the procedure dictated by
Argentine jurisprudence as to the "express reservation" argument. It
appears that the Court was suggesting that there is a condition prece-
dent to the filing of an appeal, a condition which requires one to
challenge the effectiveness of the decision which raised the grounds
45. Compafiia Swift de La Plata S.A. s/ ined. de incompetencia y reposici6n del
acto de quiebra [1977]. The decision is translated infra at Appendix II. Citations to
the decision refer to the translation.
46. See Appendix II, section 9.
47. Id. at section 10.
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for the appeal. One might well assume that filing a timely appeal is
adequate to constitute an express reservation, since the substance of
the appeal is to challenge the particular decision.
The Supreme Court reviewed the reasons given by the appellant
for raising its challenge at such a late date after the 1973 decision; it
rejected those reasons because of the need for stability of judicial
decisions dictated by public policy. One might question whether pub-
lic policy has a greater interest in rigidity of decisions than in just
resolutions of controversies. The Court made clear its significant con-
cern that the judiciary not be viewed as merely an arm of oscillating
political structures in Argentina, by suggesting that any acceptance of
the appellant's argument would 'imply an admission of [the] non-
existence of the judicial branch of government during a period such
as that of the political situation to which reference has been
made." 48  This is a clear indication that one may criticize the sub-
stance of decisions of the Court, but should not criticize the sub-
stance of the composition of the Court or its alliance with oscillating
political structures. 4 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Deltec has directly appealed to the President of the
Argentine Republic, it is likely that the judicial participation in the
Deltec controversy has been concluded. Whatever may be the out-
come of further negotiations by Deltec with the Argentine govern-
ment, the three Supreme Court decisions have made noteworthy con-
tributions to Argentine jurisprudence. Of considerable importance for
foreign investment, these decisions also add to the otherwise sparse
aggregate of precedent in Latin America-a quality which is inherent
in civil law systems.
48. Id. at section 11.
49. A distinction should be made between a judiciary which possesses a
philosophical identity with the executive, from one which responds to either the
latter's directives or to what the judiciary may believe would be, the most accepted
decision in view of executive policy toward foreign investment. A shared political
philosophy is to be expected in most judicial appointments; one has only to look at
the appointments in the last decade to the Supreme Court of the United States.
"Court stacking" is a more severe problem in a nation such as Argentina, where an
executive may replace the entire Supreme Court, as contrasted with appointing per-
sons of similar or controlled philosophies to vacancies which may arise during the
presidential term of office. Where the entire Supreme Court is replaced by each
executive, it may not be particularly important whether the court members share a
common philosophy with the executive or whether they respond to executive dictate,
the parallelism suggested above will likely be reflected in judicial decisions.
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The members of the Court demonstrated a predictable sensitivity
toward criticism of the viability of the Supreme Court as a judicial
institution during the Per6n administration. If it seemed to Deltec
representatives and to some outside observers that the Supreme
Court members during the Per6n era comprised less of a separate
and independent institution than a judicial arm of the administration,
then the same might well be said, from a different political per-
spective, of the composition of the Court under the current execu-
tive. It is, consequently, not surprising that members of the Court
took issue with Deltec's claims challenging the validity of Supreme
Court decisions under Per6n. It is impossible to calculate the extent
to which the displeasure with such an uncourtly argument, politically,
as well as judicially, affected the Court and resulted in its refusal to
respond more fully to the important issues affecting Deltec which had
evolved from the La Esperanza decision.
La Esperanza illustrated the willingness of the Court to respond
directly to legal issues, although one must realize that it found itself
able to avoid ruling on the validity of the 1973 Cia. Swift decision.
Nevertheless, the Court quite emphatically rejected the lower courts'
implementation of the 1973 decision's stipulation that a determination
be made of the economic unit. La Esperanza clearly suggested that
apart from any challenge to the validity of the economic unit theory,
reasonable procedures were necessary to determine the scope of any
such unit, and alleged participants must have their day in court to
refute their inclusion as part of the economic unit. La Esperanza's
good fortune primarily resulted from its not being specifically men-
tioned in the 1973 Ciu. Swift decision. Moreover, it may have been
aided by the fact that the assets of Swift appeared substantially
adequate to satisfy the claims of creditors, depending on the extent of
the government's indexing and demands for administrative costs. Fi-
nally, the absence of any challenge to the integrity of the judiciary
under Per6n may also have been important.
What is of substantial concern, nevertheless, is that the inciden-
tal naming Deltec International Limited and Deltec Argentina in
paragraph I of the 1973 Cia. Swift decision (where the Court referred
to the Deltec Group as "especially" including assets of Deltec Interna-
tional Limited and Deltec Argentina), ultimately served to foreclose
those two enterprises from a ruling on the same issues on which La
Esperanza succeeded. The Supreme Court, in the 1977 decision,
never adequately separated the rights of the enterprises specifically
identified in the 1973 Cia. Swift decision-Deltec International Lim-
ited and Deltec Argentina-from those not so identified, including La
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Esperanza. This failure to make any inquiry into the composition of
the Deltec Group in the 1977 decision compounded the fact-finding
shortcomings of the 1973 decision. Since the 1973 litigation did not
involve the participation of Deltec International Limited and Deltec
Argentina, but only of Swift, one cannot argue that it was proper for
the Court to suggest that the former companies had the benefit of
their day in court. While Deltec International Limited and Deltec
Argentina ultimately did have their day in court, the Supreme Court
made it clear in the 1977 decision that they were upset with Deltec's
postponement of that day until a purportedly more sympathetic judi-
cial tribunal had come into existence.
The final judicial outcome was obviously disappointing to Deltec,
although it welcomed with considerable relief the La Esperanza rul-
ing. It appeared that the assets of Swift would be adequate to pay
creditors, even with the indexing process adopted by the administra-
tion. An executive-imposed delay in seeking a final determination,
however, could have resulted in an increasing erosion of other valu-
able Deltec International entities, particularly La Esperanza.
In viewing the three decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Argentine foreign investment legislation, one initially finds the 1973
Cia. Swift decision to have been harsh, arbitrary, and unsupported
by legislation. The 1976 La Esperanza decision may be viewed as
moderating the harshness of the economic unit theory by modifying
the arbitrary procedures adopted in response to the Cia. Swift ruling.
On closer inspection, it was the lower court's response to the 1973
Supreme Court decision rather than the Supreme Court decision it-
self which was harsh and arbitrary, a point not fully recognized in the
final appeal by Deltec.
The final 1977 decision adds comparatively little to the context of
the economic unit theory, or even to the question of the arbitrariness
of the judicial resolution of these controversies. Rather, the decision
is more important for its response to the direct attack upon the al-
legedly doubtful viability of the Argentine judiciary as an indepen-
dent arm of the government during the Per6n administration, with its
obvious underlying implications as to the Argentine judicial structure
in general. The sensitivity of the Court in the 1977 decision to any
challenge aimed at the viability of the judiciary is very significant,
and suggests a certain parallelism in executive, legislative and judicial
pronouncements in Argentina. The response of the Supreme Court in
the 1977 decision was to refuse to consider the merits of the idea that
the judiciary might not have always been an independent part of the
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government. Indeed, the Court took umbrage with the suggestion
that it was not independent.
The complexities of the Deltec plight and the lack of access to
adequate facts leaves much uncertain. In brief, the cases involved the
economic unit theory, the concept of indexing, and foreign invest-
ment legislation. Although foreign investment legislation appears to
be of indirect importance, it nonetheless reflects the changing Argen-
tine executive policy toward foreign investment.
The intricate web of a half dozen years of Deltec's difficulties in
Argentina, involving a perplexing and somewhat irrational series of
political, legislative, and judicial fluctations, should be sufficient to
allow an observer to formulate an opinion as to the role of the
judiciary in developing foreign investment law in Argentina. If any
one lesson is to be learned from the Deltec experience, it would
seem that however subservient to administrative policy one deems
the judiciary of a given nation, the viability of one period of a court's
history is not a successful issue to raise before that court. While the
donning of judicial robes in some nations may be, in reality, a little
more than political patronage with expected obedience, there is often
a mystique about the wearing of those robes which may nonetheless
give rise to an unexpected assertion of judicial independence. This
mystique has occurred in many eras and many cultures not only with
judges, but with others, such as the clergy; it is not a phenomenon
restricted to Third World nations. It is best to concentrate on legal
issues in legal tribunals and, where challenges to the viability of the
court itself are to be made, if they are to be at all successful, it is best
to recognize the need to be far more subtle than was the challenge in
the Deltec experience.
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The following case translations have been modified by the author,
principally to conform with the translations of the 1973 Cia. Swift
decision. The translation of the 1973 decision, prepared by Rafael
C. Benitez, Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School,
may be found at page 330, volume 6, Lawyer of the Americas.
APPENDIX I
THE 1976 LA ESPERANZA DECISION
C-154-LVII. Compaiiia Swift de
La Plata Bankruptcy
Proceeding under article 250 of
the Code of Civil and Commer-
cial Procedure
Supreme Court of the Nation
Buenos Aires, September 21, 1976.
Having reviewed the records, to wit: "Bankruptcy proceeding of
Compafifa Swift de La Plata under article 250 of the Code of Civil
Commercial Procedure by authority of Ingenio Lae Esperanza, S.A."
Whereas:
1. For a better understanding of the problem which must be
resolved, it is necessary to outline the development of the proceeding
in reference to the specific questions being studied.
a. The judge of the first instance-at the time of the presenta-
tion of Mr. Jose R. Zurdo [creditor] to the effect that the dispositive
portion of the writ that declared the bankruptcy of Compafiia Swift de
La Plata, S.A., be clarified in the sense that it be understood to cover
the entire Deltec group-determined that "the previous discussion of
the assets of the bankrupt corporation, relates to the extension of lia-
bility to all the enterprises of the group" (judicial act dated November
16, 1971).
b. Swift and various unconfirmed creditors appealed without
questioning the requisite of the previous discussion [seizure and sale
of assets to satisfy a demand].
c. The National Commercial Court of Appeals, Chamber "C",
annulled the resolution extending liability (judicial act at page 10.613,
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June 6, 1972). Against said decision, Mr. Zurdo presented an extraor-
dinary appeal, decided by this Court, September 4, 1973 [the earlier
Cia. Swift decision].
d. The Court stated, inter alia, on the basis of article 16 of Law
48:
I, That the inclusion of the assets of Swift de La Plata
Sociedad Anonima Frigorifica should also include the assets of the
companies comprising the "Deltec group," especially those of Deltec
International Limited and Deltec Argentina S.A.F. y M. (arts. 1, 3,
6, and 104 of Law 11.719; report of the Referee pages 3161-63,
3981-86, 4113-24; report of the National Meat Board pages 10.033
and 10.123-5).
II. That in the proper proceeding, there should be deter-
mined what other persons or companies comprise the mentioned
group [Deltec group] to the extent that the latter comprises an
economic unit with the bankrupt company.
III. That the joint execution should be carried out with re-
spect to all the named assets without prior discussion (exclusion) of
the assets of Swift de La Plata S.A. Frigorifica (art. 73 et al. and 104
of Law 11.719 and arg. art. 170, so-called Law 19.151).
IV. That the natural or legal persons mentioned in Sections
I and II above, once having been designated as therein decreed, may
exercise those rights to which they are entitled through proceedings
in exclusion or restitution of assets (arg. arts. 81 et al. of the so-called
Law 19.551).
e. Two days after this decision, the Judge of First Instance, tak-
ing into account the reports of the National Board of Meat and the
Section of Tax Violations of the General Tax Division and the decision
of the Court summarized above in "d.," declared the bankruptcy of
various enterprises and corporations, including the one appealing
herein.
f. That Ingenio La Esperanza, S.A., appealed alleging that it had
not been notified, and that it had not been able to carry out any
declarations.
g. That the National Commercial Court of Appeals, Chamber
"C," confirmed, in pages 327-329, the questions previously resolved;
having understood that the "procedure" to which the dispossession of
the assets of the "Deltec group" is subject to "can only consist of the
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simple verification by the Judge of the bankruptcy of their condition
as such ... to pretend that in said procedure that the subject en-
tities be allowed to participate as parties, would be equivalent to rec-
ognition of their character as separate third parties" (page 327).
2. That an extraordinary appeal was presented challenging this
decision (pages 333-343), granted at page 344. In that appeal, it was
argued, in essence, that there was an erroneous interpretation of the
judgment of September 4, 1973, in the records "Appeal of fct pre-
sented by Jose R. Zurdo in the civil process of Cia. Swift de La Plata,
S.A.F., in the meeting of creditors [convocatoria] (currently the bank-
ruptcy proceeding), file C.665" and an evident waiver of the decision
of the Court, since no proceeding took place to verify the fraud-
which must necessarily have existed to make possible the extension of
the bankruptcy to all the related corporations-having been resolved
with giving the accused an opportunity to defend itself. It [the ap-
peal] concludes by asserting that without a demonstration that the
appellant formed an economic unit with the bankrupt party, "the au-
tonomus juridical personality of the corporations cannot be altered,
and as long as they are not convicted of the violation of art. 165 of
Law Decree 19.551, they shall be considered as separate third parties
vis-'-vis the bankrupt entity, in respect to their defense in a trial in
the relevant proceeding." Consequently, in the opinion of the appel-
lant, said constitutional guarantee would be violated and the appealed
sentence would be a clear example of an arbitrary sentence.
Later (pages 370-381), the appellant presented a petition in order
that the resolution dictated by this Court (in its prior decision of
September 4, 1973, in the records previously mentioned) be de-
clared invalid. It bases its request on the Court's lack of jurisdiction
and on a violation of the limits of the appeal, citing numerous
doctrinal opinions and restating the aforementioned reasons.
3. That the extraordinary appeal is in order, since the interpreta-
tion of the decision of the Court and its mandatory character are at
issue, which involves a federal question in accordance with art. 18 of
Statute 48, since, when interpreting its decisions, the only cases au-
thorizing the granting of the appeal are those in which the decisions
of the lower courts disclaim the previous pronouncement (sentence of
past June 22nd in re "National Treasury v. Roca de Schroder, Agus-
tina and others regarding the expropriation," and its citations).
4. That, in that sense, it is necessary to state that once the judi-
cial decision of September 4, 1973 was dictated, it was imperative to
ARGENTINE JURISPRUDENCE
follow the proper "procedure" to determine which enterprises or cor-
porations make up the "Deltec group" insofar as an economic unit
exists with the bankrupt corporation. Such a procedure evidently in-
volved the adoption of various measures tending to give credit to the
"economic unit" of the enterprises referred to, with a proper hearing
for them because as the transcript demonstrates, not all cases are
exactly alike, since we are dealing with a typical question of fact
which must be proved in a proceeding which asks to allow the pre-
sentation of a fair defense.
5. That the decision of the Judge of the first instance declaring
the bankruptcy of several enterprises that are presumably part of the
"group," supported by the opinions mentioned above and the reports
of the National Board of Meat and the Section of Tax Violations of the
General Tax Division, does not constitute a valid procedure with re-
spect to the appellant, since from it would emerge the economic
unity of "Deltec International" with "Swift" but not that of the "In-
genio La Esperanza S.A." with "Swift," and insofar as it refers to
unilateral administrative acts without records of any participation or
possibility of defense by the appellant.
6. That the lower court, in holding that the procedure followed
by the judge to extend the bankruptcy to the linked enterprises was
correct, has not interpreted the distinction made by the Court on
September 4, 1973, which requires a determination of the "other per-
sons or companies making up the group previously mentioned insofar
as an economic unit exists with the corporation declared bankrupt."
In fact, if such a distinction were not accepted, this sentence would
be contradictory in itself, in expressly declaring the bankruptcy of
various corporations, and implicitly extending it to an imprecise
group of enterprises. Thus, the determinative procedure which in-
cludes a preliminary and essential character would suffer a loss of
meaning.
7. That it is then necessary to demonstrate in records, in a pre-
cise and concrete manner, with a proper participation of the in-
terested party, whether the latter acted in the interest of, and as a
representative of, "Swift" or "Deltec"; whether property was disposed
of in fraud of the creditors, since by the mere fact of being linked to
the group one cannot presume the performance of fraudulent ma-
neuvers tending to prejudice its proprietary equity situation; or
whether it had engaged in a commercial conduct affecting directly or
indirectly "Swift's" state of bankruptcy.
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8. That the guarantee of the defense at trial requires, above all,
that no one be arbitrarily denied an adequate and appropriate protec-
tion of any existing rights (Decisions: 267:228 and sentence of Sep-
tember 9, 1975, in re Q.11 "Quenon N. v. Directors of the Popular
Financial Bank regarding an ordinary claim"), equally insuring all the
litigants right to obtain a well supported decision, after a trial in
proper legal form, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding (Deci-
sions: 268-266), requiring an indispensable observance of the substan-
tial forms relative to the indictment, defense, evidence, and sentence
(Decisions: 272:168).
9. That in the case, as noted, the appellant did not have an op-
portunity to verify its statements in the sense that it is not tied "in an
economic unit" with either "Swift" or "Deltec Argentina, S.A." be-
cause, on the contrary, it carries out its commercial policy in an in-
dependent fashion, reinvesting its profits, etc.
10. That, therefore, this last statement is essential to the defense
of the appellant not only to fulfill merely formal requirements, but
also to avoid the violation of express constitutional rights, regardless
of who is protected by them, much more so when, if such extreme
were proven, the bankruptcy declaration would be contrary to the
law.
11. That, for the reasons stated above, the extraordinary appeal
based on the arbitrariness doctrine is in order, and due to prejudice
to the defense at trial, it is necessary to set aside the judgment ap-
pealed, which, in erroneously interpreting a ruling of this Court,
dismissed the offenses relative to the necessary intervention by the
appellant in the proceedings determining its presumptive economic
unity with the bankrupt entity, when considering it unnecessary to
the latter. (Doctrine of the judgment of November 4, 1975, in re
"Gatto H. v. Formata Argentina S.R.L.").
12. That in this line of thinking, one can emphasize the state-
ment made by the appellant, that a long time after the bankruptcy
declaration, the proceedings have not been continued, and the pro-
cess of liquidation of the property has not begun; this being an uncer-
tain situation that should be solved so as to protect the rights of the
creditors and to facilitate the normal development of enterprises that
are not involved in objectionable maneuvers, guaranteeing, if neces-
sary, the subsistence and evolution of important sources of employ-
ment, having taken into account the essentially dynamic character of
the former.
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13. That the way of resolving the problem makes it unnecessary
to decide in this case whether the previous decision by the Court is
valid or not, with respect to the point the appellant alleges has ex-
ceeded the limits of the appeal.
Therefore, having been decided by the Hon. Attorney General,
the judgment appealed -shall be set aside. Let the records be for-
warded to the court of origin so that a new decision can be issued by
the proper authorities in accordance with the present one. Notify and
remand.
HORACIO H. HEREDIA - ADOLFO R. GABRIELLE, ALEJAN-
DRO R. CARIDE - FEDERICO VIDELA ESCALADA.
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APPENDIX II
THE 1977 DECISION
C-503-LVLI. Compaiiia Swift
de La Plata S.A. Bankruptcy
Proceeding
Supreme Court of the Nation
Buenos Aires, December 27, 1977
Having reviewed the records, to wit: "Bankruptcy pro-
ceeding of Compafiia Swift de La Plata regarding jurisdiction and re-
view."
Whereas:
1. The lower court having refused judicial approval of the ar-
rangement plan proposed by Swift de La Plata S.A.F., based on its
affiliation, in ownership and management, with the group of enter-
prises known as "Deltec," this affiliation being considered the deter-
minative cause of the economic imbalance in which Swift found itself,
apart from other circumstances which rendered it unworthy of such
benefit [i.e., an arrangement with its creditors], the insolvent debtor
appealed to the National Commercial Court of Appeals, Chamber
"C", which affirmed the contested order insofar as it denied judicial
approval [to the plan] and declared the bankruptcy of the company.
2. There having been requested a clarification of the lower
court's judgment as to whether the state of insolvency which had
been adjudicated "includes and extends to the Deltec groTip as the
real owner of the unified structure," the court responded that, sub-
ject to the exhaustion of the assets of the insolvent debtor company,
it would be appropriate "to extend liability to all of the enterprises of
the group."
3. The decision was reversed by the Commercial Chamber on
the grounds that it went beyond the "scope and nature of a clarifica-
tion order;" that it lacked "the most elementary requrements regard-
ing the identification of the parties to be -affected by it" (enterprises of
the "Deltec" group); and that there had not been complied with "the
most elementary requirements of due process."
ARGENTINE JURISPRUDENCE
4. The movant who had raised the challenge to the claims which
the "Deltec" companies had attempted to file in the Swift insolvency
proceedings-that is, Mr. Jose R. Zurdo-submitted against this
judgment an extraordinary appeal which, while rejected by the
Chamber, was accepted by the Supreme Court which decided, on
September 4, 1973, "to reverse said judgment insofar as it did not
extend to Deltec International Limited and to Deltec Argentina S.A.
the responsibility for the bankruptcy decree for Cia. Swift de La Plata
S.A.F. (art. 165 of Law 19.551)."
In the same opinion, the Court, relying on the authority con-
ferred on it by Law 48, Art. 16, second part, declared:
I. That the inclusion of the assets of Swift de La Plata
Sociedad Anonima Frigorifica should also include the assets of the
companies comprising the "Deltec group," especially those of Deltec
International Limited and Deltec Argentina S.A.F. y M. (arts. 1, 3, 6
and 104 of Law 11.719; report of the Referee pages 3161-63, 3981-86,
4111-24; report of the National Meat Board pages 10.033 and
10.123-5).
II. That in the proper proceeding, there should be deter-
mined what other persons or companies comprise the mentioned
group [Deltec group] to the extent that the latter comprises an
economic unit with the bankrupt company.
III. That the joint execution should be carried out with re-
spect to all the named assets without prior discussion (exclusion) of
the assets of Swift de La Plata S.A. Frigorifica (art. 73 et al. and 104
of Law 11.719 and arg. art. 170, so-called Law 19.151).
IV. That the natural or legal persons mentioned in Sections
I and II above, once having been designated as therein decreed, may
exercise those rights to which they are entitled through proceedings
in exclusion or restitution of assets (arg. arts. 81 et al. of the so-called
Law 19.551).
5. As appears in the record, once the September 4, 1973 deci-
sion had been handed down, the Judge of the First Instance decreed
the bankruptcy of those companies thought to belong to the so-called
"Deltec group." Of these, Deltec International Limited, Deltec Argen-
tina S.A., Compafiia Swift de La Plata S.A., and Deltec Banking
Corporation Limited, apart from the appeal that the first and last of
these took against the extension of the bankruptcy on the basis of
their being foreign corporations, the three [four?] questioned that ac-
tion in a proceeding pursuant to art. 38 of Law 19.551. They based
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their objection on the very words of the Supreme Court's opinion,
out of which, as interpreted by the appellants, there might arise only
"the dispossession of assets so that these might serve as collateral
security for the creditors with respect to the bankruptcy of Swift, but
not the bankruptcies of the companies," and concluded by asserting,
-after other arguments to the same effect, "that the obligatory nature
of decisions reached by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction implies beyond discussion that they provide the
guideposts for compliance with them (pages 264 and 444, among
many others)." Finally, appellants asserted that the judgment being
appealed from, "by changing the very nature of the Supreme Court's
decision," has ignored "not only what the Supreme Court has de-
cided" but also "the authority of res judicata as determinative of con-
stitutionally vested rights" (pages 24 and 36 Swift de La Plata S.A.F.
Proceeding regarding jurisdiction and review of bankruptcy C.583-
1976).
6. The Judge of First Instance denied rehearing and transmitted
the record to the Chamber by reason of the appeals that had been
filed in the proceedings.
After the Appeal Chamber's law officer had submitted his opin-
ion, and while the matter was pending decision, Deltec International
Limited and Deltec Argentina S.A. raised as a previous question the
non-existence, as a judicial decision, of the Supreme Court's Sep-
tember 4, 1973 decision by reason of the fundamental defects, in ap-
pellants' opinion, which it contains.
These defects are supposed to be two: excess in the exercise of
jurisdictional power and violation of the right of defense in judicial
proceedings.
In this regard, appellants argue that the Court, despite the limits
imposed on it by the scope of the extraordinary appeal, substantially
increased the severity of the lower court's decision by eliminating the
requirement of exhaustion of Swift's assets, which in the lower court's
judgment was a condition on the liability imposed on the "Deltec
group" companies, and by extending to them the dispossession of as-
sets of the insolvent debtor-and in particular to Deltec International
Limited and Deltec Argentina S.A., when these had not been origi-
nally identified as such. Appellants emphasize the violation of con-
stitutional protections which this decision implies and insist that they
could present their impeachment of the September 4, 1973 decision
only after the members of the Court who had signed it had been
replaced.
ARGENTINE JURISPRUDENCE
7. To the National Commercial Court of Appeals, in passing on
this contention, it appeared that the Supreme Court, in its new com-
position, had conceded, in its decision of September 21, 1976, on the
appeal of Ingenio La Esperanza S.A. in records of Swift de La Plata
S.A. Bankruptcy proceeding under article 350 of the. Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure, the "existence," as valid judicial action,
of the September 4, 1973 decision, in that the Court analyzed and
applied the latter decision to the issues in the La Esperanza appeal,
which it would not have done if it had considered that decision
non-existent."
8. That against that sentence of the National Commercial Court
of Appeals, the enterprises Deltec International Limited and Deltec
Argentina S.A. have filed with us extraordinary appeals, complaining
of that tribunal's holding concerning the existence of the September
4, 1973 decision. They base their appeal entirely on their interpreta-
tion of what this Court held in the above-cited "Ingenio La Esperanza
S.A." case. Apart from that, and the Constitutional protections which
are said to be involved, the appellants attack as arbitrary the decision
from which they appeal in that the Appeals Court failed to consider
fundamental questions, such as those of lack of jurisdiction and depri-
vation of due process, which bear on the alleged inexistence of the
challenged judgment.
9. From our recitals in paragraph 5 it appears that Deltec Inter-
national Limited and Deltec Argentina, S.A., before repudiating this
Court's September 4, 1973 decision, based upon it their disagreement
with the action of the lower court in declaring the bankruptcy of the
companies constituting the so-called "Deltec group."
In that context, the attorney for Deltec Argentina, S.A. took the
position that there "applies the repeated doctrine of the Supreme
Court to the effect that it is unconstitutional fbr a decision to go out-
side the bounds of a Supreme Court holding which, rendered in the
same controversy and on the same issue, has the authority of res
judicata.'" He further contended, along the same lines, that "to
change the very nature of the Supreme Court decision is to ignore
the authority of res judicata which, according to the principles laid
down in the Supreme Court's decisions, determines vested constitu-
tional rights" (page 24 of records).
The same may be said as to the position taken by Deltec Interna-
tional Limited in this proceeding. Referring to the decision of the
lower court, Deltec's attorney states: "It is a violation of constitutional
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protections and rights (art. 18 of the Constitution) for a judge to ig-
nore the bounds of a decision by the Supreme Court of the Nation,"
and recalled that, according to the decisions of this Court, its hold-
ings "must be faithfully followed both by the parties and by judicial
organs that participate in controversies" (page 36). Beyond question,
statements such as these disclose an acquiescence in the decision
which is now under attack.
10. In similar situations this Court has settled, through repeated
and uniform decisions, the proposition that the Voluntary submission,
without any express reservation, to a particular legal regime, or a
judicial decision, or to the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, implies
an unequivocal adherence thereto which rules out a subsequent con-
stitutional challenge thereof by way of extraordinary appeal (pages
184,361; 186,523; 187,444; 245,137; 246,172; 248,371; 252,72;
269,533; 271,183; 274,153 and many more).
11. The reasons advanced by appellants to justify the timeliness
of their challenge to the existence of the September 4, 1973 decision,
have been considered and rejected by the Court in similar situations
on the ground that the stability of judicial decisions, in that it consti-
tutes an inescapable prerequisite of legal security, is a requirement of
public policy that is possessed of constitutional stature (page 250,676;
Costellano, Tristan Paul amparo proceeding), sentence of Oct. 19,
1976). Moreover, to hold otherwise would imply an admission of the
non-existence of the judicial branch of government during periods
such as that of the political situation to which reference has been
made (pages 259,69; 269,51; contra in 279,36).
NOW THEREFORE, having heard the Solicitor General, we
dismiss the extraordinary appeals heretofore allowed. With costs. Let
the parties be notified and the cause remanded.
HORACIO H. HEREDIA - ADOLFO R. GABRIELLE - PEDRO J.
FRIAS -EMILIO M. DAIREAUX.
